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Sammendrag 
Drar ansatte fordel av å være representert i selskapenes styrer? Dette spørsmålet har fått stor 
oppmerksomhet både blant økonomer og beslutningstakere - spesielt ettersom ansatterepresentasjon i 
senere tid har blitt fremmet som et viktig verktøy for å oppnå en jevnere fordeling av selskapenes 
overskudd mellom eiere og arbeidstakere. Formålet med denne artikkelen er å besvare dette 
spørsmålet med utgangspunkt i administrative data fra Norge, ved å kombinere flere ulike 
identifikasjonsstrategier. Vi finner at en arbeidstaker får høyere lønn og er mindre utsatt for 
svingninger i selskapets lønnsomhet hvis hun får jobb i et selskap med ansatterepresentasjon i styret, 
sammenliknet med en liknende arbeidstaker som får jobb i et selskap uten ansatterepresentasjon. 
Gevinsten i form av høyere og mer stabile lønninger ser imidlertid ikke ut til å være forårsaket av 
ansatterepresentasjon i seg selv: Selskaper med ansatterepresentasjon skiller seg fra selskaper uten 
ansatterepresentasjon ved at de er større og har høyere andeler arbeidstakere som er fagorganiserte, og 
store selskaper med høy andel fagorganiserte arbeidstakere har en tendens til både å betale høye 
lønninger og forsikre arbeidstakerne bedre mot svingninger i selskapets lønnsomhet. Betinget på 
selskapets størrelse og fagforeningsgrad har ansatterepresentasjon liten eller ingen effekt. Samlet sett 
tyder disse resultatene dermed på at selv om arbeidstakere kan ha nytte av å være ansatt i selskaper 
med ansatterepresentasjon, vil de ikke ha nytte av lovgivning som pålegger ansatterepresentasjon i 
styrer. 
1 Introduction
Corporations are made up of multiple stakeholders, including workers, managers, and shareholders.
The rights and interests of these stakeholders vary markedly across western market economies.
On the one hand, both the US and the UK follow a corporate governance system of shareholder
primacy. In it, it is the shareholders, and the shareholders alone, that elect the corporate board,
which directly or indirectly manages the corporation on behalf of the shareholders. On the other
hand, many European countries follow a shared governance system that grants workers formal
authority in the corporate decision-making, often in the form of worker representation on corporate
boards. As many economies have seen significant declines in the labor share of income, worker
representation on corporate boards has gained popularity as a way to ensure the interests and
views of the workers. For example, recent polls suggest that a majority of American voters want
workers to hold seats on corporate boards,1 and leading politicians both in the US and the UK are
advocating a system of shared governance.2 Yet, there is limited scientific evidence on how such a
shared governance system actually affects firms and workers.
In this paper, we contribute to an emerging empirical literature that tries to understand whether,
to what extent, and why employees benefit from worker representation on corporate boards (see
e.g. Gorton and Schmid, 2004; Jaeger, Schoefer and Heining, 2019). We find that a worker is
paid more and faces less earnings risk if she gets a job in a firm with worker representation on
the corporate board. However, these gains in wages and declines in earnings risk are not caused
by worker representation per se. Instead, the wage premium and reduced earnings risk reflect
that firms with worker representation are likely to be larger and unionized, and that larger and
unionized firms tend to both pay a premium and better insure workers against fluctuations in firm
performance. Conditional on the firm’s size and unionization rate, worker representation has little if
any effect. Taken together, these findings suggest that while workers may indeed benefit from being
employed in firms with worker representation, they would not benefit from legislation mandating
worker representation on corporate boards.
We reach these conclusions in the context of Norway, drawing on two strengths of the Norwegian
environment. First, by linking several administrative data sources we are able to construct a
matched panel dataset of all workers, firms, and corporate boards for the period 2004-2014. This
panel data allows us to measure the worker representation status of firms and to follow workers
over time, even if they switch between firms. Second, the rich data combined with institutional
features allow us to use a variety of research designs. This includes a mover design comparing
1See https://www.vox.com/2018/4/6/17086720/poll-corporate-board-democracy-worker-council-
codetermination-union-labor.
2A prominent example from the US is Senator Elizabeth Warren, who proposed a federal bill in
2018 that would give workers in large corporations the right to elect two fifths of all board seats;
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17683022/elizabeth-warren-accountable-capitalism-corporations. Worker rep-
resentation has also been high on the political agenda in the UK, with Theresa May pledging to




different groups of workers before and after a switch between firms with different representation
status; a difference-in-differences analysis studying changes in worker compensation in response
to idiosyncratic shocks to firm performance; an event study analysis exploiting differences in the
timing of adoption of worker representation; and a regression discontinuity design taking advantage
of a law regulating the rights to worker representation as a discontinuous function of firm size.
We apply this variety of research designs to draw causal inference about two related yet dis-
tinct sets of parameters. The first set captures the causal effects of working in a firm with worker
representation on the corporate board. These effects are relevant to understand how much where
you work determine what you earn and the earnings risk you face. To estimate the wage effects
of working in a firm with worker representation, we compare workers switching between firms with
different representation status to their co-workers switching between firms with the same repre-
sentation status. On average, we find that workers moving into firms with worker representation
experience a four percent increase in wages, compared with their former co-workers moving between
firms without representation. Conversely, workers moving out of firms with worker representation
experience, on average, a three percent drop in wages, compared with their former co-workers mov-
ing between firms with representation. The wages of workers in firms with worker representation
are not only higher on average, but they are also better insured against fluctuations in firm per-
formance. Controlling for time-invariant worker and firm heterogeneity, we estimate a significantly
lower pass through of idiosyncratic firm shocks to incumbent workers’ wages in firms with represen-
tation. In response to a 10 percent fall in the value added of a firm, the wages of workers decrease
by 0.9 percent in firms without worker representation, while the wages of workers only decrease by
0.2 percent in firms with worker representation.
The second set of parameters captures the causal effects of adopting worker representation on
the corporate board of a given firm. These effects are relevant for assessing the impacts of a policy
that would introduce or remove worker representation on corporate boards. Using the regulation
governing workers’ rights to representation, we find no evidence of a discontinuity in wages at the
firm size cut-off. By contrast, there is a large jump in the share of firms with worker representation
at the firm size cut-off. These findings are not likely to be driven by sorting of firms or workers; both
the density of workers and the distribution of pre-determined characteristics are smooth around the
cut-off. To complement the regression discontinuity results, we exploit differences in the timing of
adoption of worker representation in an event study analysis. We find no evidence of any significant
change in incumbent workers’ compensation in the years following adoption, relative to the control
group comprised of workers in firms adopting worker representation later in the sample period.
The estimates of these two sets of parameters suggest that while employees do benefit from
working in a firm with worker representation, the gains are not driven by worker representation
per se, but rather by other factors that are correlated with both worker representation and worker
compensation. We develop this argument in several ways. We first show that firms with worker rep-
resentation stand out as considerably larger and more unionized than firms without representation.
Returning to our analysis of job switchers, we next estimate sizable wage premia associated with
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working in larger or more unionized firms. Furthermore, we show that workers in larger or more
unionized firms are better insured against fluctuations in firm performance. Lastly, we demonstrate
that the gains from working in a firm with worker representation disappear once one accounts for
differences in firm size and the share of unionized workers
Our paper contributes to a growing empirical literature on the role of the boards of directors
in corporate governance. Adams et al. (2010) review the literature, emphasizing measurement
and identification challenges that have made it difficult to draw causal inferences in this setting.
Several recent studies have made important progress to overcome these challenges (see e.g. Ahern
and Dittmar, 2012; Black and Kim, 2012; Matsa and Miller, 2013; Bertrand et al., 2019). The
closest studies to our work are concerned with how firm and worker outcomes are influenced by
worker representation on corporate boards. In particular, a series of papers have studied worker
representation on the supervisory boards of German corporations, using (changes in) the regulations
governing workers’ right to representation to draw causal inferences. Gorton and Schmid (2004)
exploit a discontinuity in the rights to worker representation, with workers’ share of the seats on the
supervisory board increasing from one third to one half at a firm size threshold of 2,000 employees.3
Consistent with our results, they find that increasing the share of workers on the supervisory board
from one third to one half does not have a significant effect on the average wage at the firm-level.
Jaeger, Schoefer and Heining (2019) study the effects of a reform that abolished the rights to
worker representation for newly incorporated firms while leaving older firms unaffected. They find
that worker representation on supervisory boards increase investment and capital formation, while
wages are unaffected.
We complement the results from the German setting in several ways. Our paper differs in
that we distinguish between two distinct causal parameters that are both informative about the
roles of worker representation. While previous papers have focused on estimating the causal im-
pacts of introducing or removing worker representation on the corporate board of a given firm, we
complement the existing literature by presenting new evidence on the causal impacts of working
in a firm with worker representation. The latter is the relevant parameter for understanding the
sources of inequality in wages across observationally equivalent workers. Our results point to a
significant but modest effect on average wages of working in a firm with worker representation, and
a noticeable difference in the wage insurance provided by firms with and without representation.
By comparison, our analyses of adopting worker representation on the corporate board of a given
firm suggest that it has little if any impact on the wages of workers, consistent with the findings
from the German setting. Our paper also contributes by trying to explain why there are significant
effects of working in a firm with worker representation, but no effects of worker representation per
se. Our findings point to firm size and the share of unionized workers as important drivers of the
differences in compensation across workers in firms with and without worker representation.
When comparing our results to those reported in previous studies, it is useful to observe that
3More recent contributions using the same firm size threshold for identification include Lin et al. (2018), Kim et
al. (2018), and Redeker (2019).
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Germany and Norway differ in the system for worker representation. Germany has a two-tiered
board system, with both a supervisory board and an executive board. Norway, on the other hand,
has the same system as in the US, the UK, and several other European countries, with a single-tiered
board of directors. Worker representatives on the executive boards of Norwegian corporations are
likely to be more directly involved in day-to-day operations than those on the supervisory boards
of German corporations. Despite the differences in institutions, our estimates of the effects of
adopting worker representation are in line with the results from the German setting. This finding
suggests the conclusion about the absence of wage impacts of worker representation generalizes
across shared governance systems that differ markedly in the degree to which workers are given
authority in the corporate decision-making.
Our paper also contributes to a large literature on the role of labor market institutions in
the determination of wages. One set of studies investigates the relationship between unions and
(inequality in) wages (e.g. Lemieux, 1993; Card, 1996; DiNardo et al., 1996). Another set of studies
estimates firm-level heterogeneity in the pass through of changes in firm performance to wages,
interpreting the estimates as informative about the degree of wage insurance (see e.g. Guiso et al.,
2005; Juhn et al., 2018; Balke and Lamadon, 2020). Our study contributes to this literature by
estimating how wages and earnings risk vary across firms according to worker representation, firm
size, and unionization.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our data and describes our
sample selection. Section 3 describes key features of wage setting and worker representation in
Norway, and presents descriptive evidence. Section 4 estimates the causal effects of working in a
firm with worker representation. Section 5 estimates the causal effects of worker representation on
wages using both a regression discontinuity design and an event study analysis around the adoption
of worker representation. Section 6 explores alternative explanations for the differences in wage
setting between firms with and without representation and describes potential mechanisms. The
final section concludes.
2 Data
Below we describe our data and sample selection. Details about the data sources and each of the
variables are given in Appendix Section A.
2.1 Data sources
Our empirical analyses are based on several administrative data sources that we are able to link
together using unique identifiers for firms and workers. This results in a matched panel dataset
with detailed information on the characteristics and outcomes of Norwegian workers, firms, and
corporate boards for the period 2004-2014.
Our main source of data on employment and workers’ compensation is a matched employer-
employee panel data set, consisting of annual tax records of the universe of workers that are
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matched to non-pecuniary information about employment from the Norwegian Labor and Welfare
Administration. This register is used in the administration of sickness benefits and therefore subject
to extensive quality controls. The dataset includes information on total earnings, contracted hours,
and the number of days worked at each job. Earnings include fixed salary, bonus, overtime, and
vacation and severance pay, but exclude sickness benefits. We construct hourly wages using annual
earnings and contracted hours, adjusting for the number of days worked.
Our firm data draws on several administrative registers maintained by the Brønnøysund Register
Center. We obtain information from firms’ income statements and balance sheets, including revenue
and cost of inputs, from the Register of Company Accounts. This register covers the universe of
limited liability firms – the most common legal entity type of firms and also the population affected
by the regulation governing the rights to worker representation. In our analysis, we define value
added as revenue net of cost of inputs. We merge the income statement and balance sheet data
with information on the industry and geographic location of each firm from the Central Register
of Establishments and Enterprises.
Lastly, starting in 2004 we are able to merge in administrative data on the composition of
boards of directors from the Register of Legal Entities. Firms are required by law to report the
identity and the role of each director, including whether each director was elected by and among
the employees or by the shareholders. This allows us to observe the worker representation status of
each firm from 2004 onward, and to measure adoption of worker representation for firms adopting
worker representation on the corporate board for the first time.
2.2 Sample selection and summary statistics
We construct our baseline sample using workers between 25 and 60 years old and define the highest-
paying job in each year as the worker’s main job. We exclude firms operating in industries which
are exempt from the regulation governing worker representation (1.5% of firms, 6.6% of workers),
and we also drop a small number of observations with missing value added, industry, or region (5%
of firms, 5% of workers). With these restrictions, our baseline sample consists of about 1.5 million
workers and 128 thousand firms.
We use a variety of research designs, each with its own subsample. Table 1 summarizes the
sample restrictions and reports the number of workers and firms for each subsample. The first
subsample, which we refer to as the movers sample, restricts the full sample to workers observed
transitioning between firms with different representation status (treatment group workers) and their
co-workers switching between firms with the same representation status (control group workers).
To make sure that the treatment and control group workers are moving from similar types of firms,
we restrict the sample to firms with at least one treatment and one control group worker who
are switching jobs in the same year. The worker representation status of each firm is measured
two years before the worker switches to another firm. We focus on the first full-time job-to-job
transition for each worker and consequently exclude moves where the individual is observed claiming
unemployment insurance benefits in the year of the move.
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Table 1: Overview of the sample restrictions.
Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample Movers Stayers RD Adoption
Observation counts
Unique workers 1,561,744 31,154 336,866 627,142 19,239
Unique firms 127,741 9,119 46,397 28,589 789
Subsample restrictions
Job-to-job transition between 2005 and 2012 X
Employed by firm for at least six years X
Employer firm size between 10 and 50 X
Employer adopted worker representation between 2006 and 2012 X
Notes: This table provides an overview of the baseline sample and the sample restrictions imposed to
construct each of the four subsamples used in the analyses. In the RD sample, firm size refers to the number
of employees in the firm, measured in January of the year before the year in which we measure worker
representation status and wages.
The second subsample, which we refer to as the stayers sample, restricts the full sample to
workers observed with the same firm for at least six consecutive years. This restriction ensures that
changes in the compensation of workers in response to changes in firm performance are not driven
by selective attrition of low- or high-wage workers.
The third subsample, which we refer to as the RD sample, restricts the full sample to workers
employed by firms in a window of 20 employees on either side of the firm size discontinuity in the
rights to representation, which occurs at 30 employees.4 The final subsample, which we refer to as
the adoption sample, restricts to workers employed by a firm adopting worker representation for the
first time between 2006 and 2012.5 By limiting the time period to these years, we can require all
workers to be employed by the adopting firms at least two years before and at least three years after
the year in which a worker representative is elected. This ensures that changes in the composition
of workers within adopting firms do not affect our results.
Appendix Table B.1 compares the characteristics and sizes of the full sample and each of the
four different subsamples. The firms and workers are broadly similar across the different samples
on both worker and firm characteristics. Notably, the distributions of wages, hours worked, and
4Even though the regulation creates several discontinuities in the rights to representation, we focus on the dis-
continuity in the rights to worker representation created by the 30 employees threshold, i.e. on the extensive margin
of worker representation. This is the most relevant margin for policymakers interested in the effects on wages of
introducing worker representation on the corporate board of a given firm.
5We assume that worker representation is an absorbing state, since we observe only a small number of firms
choosing to discontinue worker representation after once having adopted.
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total earnings are very similar across all the subsamples. Firms in the movers and stayers samples
are also similar in terms of size, age, and industry composition. The adoption sample, on the other
hand, consists of younger and smaller firms, with a higher degree of unionization. By construction,
the RD sample also consists of markedly smaller firms than the other samples. These firms also
have lower rates of unionization and a different industry composition than the full sample of firms.
3 Institutional setting and descriptive evidence
In this section, we begin by reviewing the role of worker representatives on corporate boards, the
regulation governing the rights to worker representation, and some key features of wage setting
in Norway. Against this background, we then present descriptive statistics of firm-level correlates
with worker representation and the observed wage differences between workers in firms with and
without worker representation.
3.1 Corporate boards and worker representation
Corporate governance in Norway is based on similar structures as in the US, the UK, and several
other European countries, with a single-tiered board of directors. In a single-tiered system, the
corporate board is involved in the day-to-day operations of the firm and responsible for hiring
the CEO, setting the compensation of managers, and for managing long-term plans and budgets.
Germany and a few other countries6, on the other hand, have two-tiered systems with both a
supervisory board and an executive board. The executive board is involved in day-to-day operations
of the firm, while the supervisory board is primarily engaged in long-term planning and supervision
of the executive board. In two-tiered systems, workers are generally represented at the supervisory
board.
In Norway, workers’ right to representation on the corporate board was established as an insti-
tution in 1972, with legal regulations provided by the Norwegian Limited Liability Companies Act
(“Aksjeloven”). Worker representatives are elected by and among the employees, not the share-
holders, but have the same rights and responsibilities as regular board members elected by the
shareholders. The law specifies workers’ right to representation as a discontinuous function of firm
size: In firms with less than 30 employees, workers have no rights to representation on the board
(but worker representation is not actively discouraged); in firms with between 30 and 50 employees,
workers can demand at least one representative on the corporate board; in firms with between 50
and 200 employees, workers can demand at least two representatives and up to one third of the
board members; and in firms with more than 200 employees, worker representation on the corpo-
rate board is mandatory unless workers are represented on the firm’s corporate assembly or on the
corporate board of a different firm within the same corporate group (a group of firms with common
6These countries include Austria, Denmark, and Poland. In France, firms are free to choose between a two-tiered
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Figure 1: Share of workers represented at the corporate board by employer firm size.
Notes: This figure shows the share of workers employed by a firm with at least one worker representative on the
corporate board. Firms are categorized by the number of employees in January of year t−1, and each line represents
a separate firm size category. The figure is constructed using the baseline worker sample defined in Section 2.
ownership).7 Firms expecting to be only temporarily above a given firm size threshold can apply
to be exempt from the regulation, and the general regulation does not apply to firms operating in
industries with industry-specific regulations.8
Figure 1 shows that worker representation on the corporate board is a pervasive institution
in the Norwegian labor market. In our full sample, about 40% of workers are employed by firms
with at least one worker representative on the corporate board. The figure also shows that the
prevalence of worker representation is increasing with firm size: The share of workers represented
at the corporate board ranges from about 3% for workers in firms with less than 30 employees to
nearly 80% in firms with more than 200 employees.
3.1.1 Wage determination, labor unions, and worker representatives
The Norwegian labor market is characterized by a relatively high coverage of collective bargaining
agreements. Nevertheless, there is substantial room for individual firms to adjust wages. In the
most common form of collective agreements in the private sector, general guidelines or minimum
wages are established at the industry-level while bargaining takes place at the firm-level. According
to the 2012 Norwegian Workplace Survey, these agreements cover about 50% of private sector
workers. Moreover, about 30% of workers are not covered by collective agreements. This means
that individual firms can have considerable influence on wages for about 80% of all private sector
workers. For the remaining 20% of workers, all bargaining takes place at the sector- or industry-
7The corporate assembly is similar to the supervisory board in two-tiered systems, and one-third of the members
must be elected by the employees.
8Exempt industries include newspapers and media, bank and insurance, and off-shore drilling. These industries
are subject to other regulations.
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level.9
Union representatives are the voice of the workers within the firm and play a key role in firm-
level negotiations, where they bargain with the management of the firm on behalf of their members.
Besides participating in negotiations, local union representatives often provide support, informa-
tion, and advice to members of the union. And while labor unions and worker representation
on corporate boards are distinct entities, they are likely to be closely related in practice: Union
representatives can provide information about workers’ rights to representation on the corporate
board, organize and participate in elections, and provide information and training to those elected
to serve as worker representatives on the board. Nevertheless, the channels through which a worker
representative and a union representative can influence worker compensation are different. Worker
representatives serve on the board with the same rights and responsibilities as regular board mem-
bers, and can propose and vote for firm-wide bonus schemes, executive pay schemes, demand to
institute a collective agreement, and influence the overall strategy of the firm for the firm-level
negotiations with the union representatives.
3.2 Descriptive evidence
Before turning to the identification and estimation of the two sets of causal parameters, we here
present and discuss the results from a descriptive analysis of firm-level correlates with worker repre-
sentation and the wage differences between workers in firms with and without worker representation.
3.2.1 Firm-level correlates with worker representation
Figure 2 shows differences in the rates of worker representation between firms with different observ-
able characteristics. Firms with worker representation are generally larger, more unionized, and
older than firms without representation. This pattern persists when we regress the indicator for
worker representation on all observed firm characteristics: Firms with more than 200 employees
are 58 percentage points more likely than firms with less than 30 employees to have at least one
worker representative on the corporate board, conditional on all other observed firm characteristics.
Similarly, workers in firms in which more than 50% of the workers are unionized are 25 percentage
points more likely to be represented on the corporate board than workers in firms where less than
10% of the workers are unionized.
In Appendix Figure B.1 we complement the correlations by comparing the explanatory power
of each observed characteristic in the regressions from Figure 2. The partial R2s are normalized
to sum to one such that each of the reported values can be directly interpreted as the share of
explained variability that is attributable to an observable aspect of the firm. Firm size is the most
important predictor of whether the firm has worker representation and accounts for about 75% of
the explained variability in rates of worker representation across firms.
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Figure 2: Firm characteristics correlated with worker representation.
Notes: This figure plots the coefficients from a regression of an indicator for whether the firm has at least one
worker representative on the corporate board on different firm-level characteristics (“bivariate”). The “multivariate”
coefficients are from a regression of an indicator for whether the firm has at least one worker representative on the
corporate board on all the pre-determined firm characteristics simultaneously. The firm characteristics are defined
in Appendix Table A.1, and the sample used is the baseline sample as defined in Section 2. The horizontal lines
show 90% confidence intervals constructed using standard errors clustered at the firm-level. We measure the firm
characteristics in year t−1, to ensure that they are pre-determined relative to when we measure worker representation.
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3.2.2 Average wage levels
Figure 3 plots differences in log hourly wages between workers in firms with and without worker
representation. On average, workers in firms with worker representation earn about 16% more
per hour than workers in firms without representation. This raw wage difference varies with the
skill level and union membership status of workers, and is larger for high-skilled and non-unionized
workers than for low-skilled and unionized workers. Each bar in the figure adds a set of con-
trols for pre-determined firm and worker characteristics. Controlling for observable characteristics
significantly reduces the differences in wage levels between workers in firms with and without rep-
resentation, suggesting that omitted variable bias is a major threat to identification in this setting.
Nevertheless, even after controlling for observables, workers in firms with worker representation
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Figure 3: Observed differences in log hourly wages.
Notes: This figure plots the coefficients from a regression of log hourly wages on an indicator for whether the firm
has at least one worker representative on the corporate board, estimated for all workers in the baseline sample and
separately for subgroups of workers with different characteristics. The worker characteristics are defined in Appendix
Table A.1. In the first set of bars, there are no controls included. The second set of bars controls for a cubic
polynomial in the worker’s age. The third set of bars additionally controls for year fixed effects, industry fixed effects,
region (of the firm) fixed effects, whether the firm is publicly listed, whether the firm is part of a corporate group,
and whether the board represents the entire corporate group. The last set of bars also controls for the average age of
workers in the firm, the immigrant share, the share of workers that are male, the share of workers that are unionized,
and the share of high-skilled workers. The gray lines on the bars show 90% confidence intervals constructed using
standard errors clustered at the firm-level, and the sample used is the baseline sample as defined in Section 2.
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4 Impacts of working in a firm with worker representation
The descriptive evidence presented in the previous section shows that workers in firms with worker
representation earn more than other workers. However, this raw wage difference could be entirely
driven by sorting of workers of higher quality into firms with worker representation. To address
this concern, we now apply research designs that control for unobserved worker heterogeneity in
order to draw causal inferences about the impacts of working in a firm with worker representation.
4.1 Worker representation wage premium
We first examine whether firms with worker representation pay systematically higher wages than
firms without; that is, whether there exists a worker representation wage premium. We use a
difference-in-differences (DiD) framework comparing the wage growth of co-workers, where one
worker switches to a firm with worker representation and the other to a firm without.
To provide a graphical illustration of the research design, it is helpful to recenter the data
such that the moves occur at time zero. In particular, we estimate the following time-varying DiD
specification:
wi,s = αi + πs +
3∑
k=−3
τk1[s = k,G(i) = 1] + εi,s, (1)
where s denotes year relative to when the worker switched firms, αi is a worker fixed effect that
captures the returns to time-invariant worker characteristics (such as ability), πs denotes time
effects, and G(i) is an indicator for whether worker i switched to a firm with worker representation.
The error term εi,s includes unobserved transitory wage determinants. We measure the worker
representation status of both origin and destination firms in year s = −2, to make sure it is
predetermined relative to the year of the move. The coefficients of interest τk capture the wage
impact of working in a firm with worker representation, measured k years before or after the move.
To summarize the estimates, we also construct a single estimate of the wage impact of working
in a firm with worker representation by replacing the period-specific indicators 1[s = k,G(i) = 1]
and the corresponding coefficients τk with a single post-treatment indicator 1[k > 0, G(i) = 1] and
a single coefficient τpost. In the year of the move (k = 0), workers are partially treated and we
measure wages as the employment-duration weighted average of wages in the new and old job. For
this reason, we exclude the year of the move from the post-treatment estimates.
4.1.1 Threats to identification and external validity
By including a worker fixed effect (αi), we control for any time-invariant worker heterogeneity
affecting both wages and whether the person moves to a firm with worker representation. Aggregate
shocks that are common to both groups over time are absorbed by the time effects. The identifying
assumption is a common trend assumption, implying that the wage growth of workers moving to
a firm without representation is a valid counterfactual for those moving to a firm with worker
representation.
15
In terms of the internal validity of the estimated wage premia from equation (1), there are some
potential concerns related to the possibility that worker mobility is driven either by transitory wage
shocks or by firm shocks at the origin firm. First, workers who experience negative shocks to their
own productivity might sort into firms with worker representation, where compensation could be
less tied to the worker’s short-term performance. If this were the case, we would expect the wage
growth of workers in the treatment group to be lower than that of the comparison group in the
years before the move. In our DiD analysis, we find no evidence of such pre-trends: the treatment
and comparison groups do not differ significantly in their wage growth in the years before the move.
Second, workers in firms experiencing negative shocks to performance may be more likely to move
to firms with worker representation, where job security might be higher. In this case, the estimated
worker representation wage premium would be overstated. However, by having control groups that
consist of co-workers in the same origin firm moving to different destination firms, we can control
for firm-wide shocks in the pre-period.
In addition to the threats to internal validity, one may be concerned that the estimated wage
effects for workers moving into a firm with worker representation are not representative for the pop-
ulation of workers at large. In particular, if workers sort into firms with worker representation based
on match effects that are correlated with worker representation, the wage effects for the treatment
group movers could be overstated relative to the wage effects for the average worker. For example,
individualized wage bargaining could be more prominent in firms with worker representation, and
workers selecting into these firms might be more productive and more adept at bargaining. If
mobility between firms with different worker representation status is driven by sorting on match
effects, we would expect wage gains associated both with moving into and with moving out of a firm
with worker representation, relative to their comparison groups, for whom there is no change in
the match effect. In the DiD analysis below, we examine this implication by conducting a separate
analysis for workers moving out of a firm with worker representation. Comparing these results with
those based on workers moving into a firm with worker representation, we find wage impacts that
are similar in magnitude and opposite in sign. This symmetry is consistent with our log-additive
model that assumes no systematic match effects, indicating that the worker representation wage
premium may be representative for the overall population of workers.
4.1.2 Difference-in-Differences analyses
Figure 4 plots the DiD estimates τk from the specification in equation (1), for k ∈ {−3, . . . , 3}.
We normalize the estimates to be relative to two years before the move by setting τ−2 = 0. The
dashed horizontal line represents the treatment effect for the post-treatment period (k > 0). Panel
(a) considers workers switching into a firm with worker representation, while Panel (b) considers
workers switching from a firm with representation to one without.
Reassuringly, we find no evidence of significant differences in pre-trends. In the years before the
move, the wage growth of workers in the treated and comparison groups are very similar, and none
of the pre-period estimates are significantly different from zero at conventional levels. The similarity
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in pre-trends supports the identifying assumption, and thus, indicates that the wage growth of the
comparison groups may provide a valid counterfactual for the wage growth of the treated groups.
As a result, the post-treatment estimates have a causal interpretation as the impacts of working in
a firm with worker representation.
On average, workers switching into a firm with worker representation experience a 4.3% increase
in wages in the years after the move as compared to workers in the comparison group. Conversely,
workers switching out of a firm with worker representation experience, on average, a 3.4% decrease
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Figure 4: Graphical evidence: Worker representation wage premium
Notes: These figures plot the estimated τk coefficients (along with 95% confidence intervals) from the specification
in equation (1), for k ∈ {−3, . . . , 3}. The parameter τpost indicates the impact in the post-treatment period (k > 0).
In Panel (a), the treatment group includes workers switching from a firm without representation to a firm with
representation, while the comparison group includes workers switching between two firms without representation.
In Panel (b), the treatment group includes workers switching from a firm with representation to a firm without
representation, while the comparison group includes workers switching between two firms with representation. The
sample used is the movers sample as defined in Section 2.
Table 2 shows the sensitivity of the DiD estimates to controlling for workers’ age, as well as for
differential time effects by the year of the move, origin firm fixed effects, and the interaction between
the two. Our baseline estimates, with controls for worker fixed effects and time effects, are presented
in Column 1. Column 2 controls for a cubic polynomial in age. The third column adds controls
for a full set of indicators for the year of the move interacted with a post-treatment indicator.
This specification accounts for aggregate calendar year effects which could affect both wage growth
and the decision to switch between firms with different worker representation status. Moving
from Column 3 to Column 4, we include origin firm fixed effects interacted with a post-treatment
indicator. The last column also includes a full set of year of move-by-origin firm fixed effects
interacted with a post-treatment indicator. With this specification, we are effectively comparing
workers in the same firm switching jobs in the same year. It is reassuring to find that the worker
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representation wage premium does not change considerably across specifications.
Table 2: Sensitivity of the worker representation wage premium.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Into-treatment movers
Post x Into-treatment 0.043 0.042 0.043 0.035 0.034
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Nr. of firms 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874
Nr. of worker-year obs. 47,721 47,721 47,721 47,721 47,721
Panel B. Out-of-treatment movers
Post x Out-of-treatment -0.034 -0.039 -0.039 -0.035 -0.037
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Nr. of firms 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606
Nr. of worker-year obs. 98,219 98,219 98,219 98,219 98,219
Conrols
Worker FE x x x x x
Post x x x x x
Age (cubic) x x x x
Move year FE x Post x x x
Old firm FE x Post x x
Move year FE x Old firm FE x Post x
Notes: This table reports estimated worker representation wage premia from a version of equation (1) where the
period-specific indicators 1[s = k,G(i) = 1] and the corresponding coefficients τk are replaced with a single post-
treatment indicator 1[k > 0, G(i) = 1] and a single coefficient τpost. In Panel A, the treatment group includes workers
switching from a firm without representation to a firm with representation, while the comparison group includes
workers switching between two firms without representation. In Panel B, the treatment group includes workers
switching from a firm with representation to a firm without representation, while the comparison group includes
workers switching between two firms with representation. Column 1 reports the post-treatment effect from the
baseline specification with controls for worker fixed effects and event time effects. Column 2 adds a cubic polynomial
in the age of the worker. Column 3 adds indicators for the year of the move interacted with the post-treatment
indicator. Column 4 adds indicators for the origin firm interacted with the post-treatment indicator. Column 5
also includes a full set of year of move-by-origin firm fixed effects interacted with the post-treatment indicator. The
sample used is the movers sample as defined in Section 2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.
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4.2 Pass-through of firm shocks to wages
In the previous section, we found a significant wage premium associated with working in a firm with
worker representation. We now examine the sensitivity of wages to fluctuations in firm performance,
and ask whether firms with and without worker representation differ in the extent to which changes
in firm performance are passed through to wages.
To estimate the pass-through of idiosyncratic firm shocks to wages, we focus on the stayers
subsample. Restricting to stayers allows us to control for time-invariant worker and firm unobserv-
ables, and ensures that our results are not affected by changes in the composition of workers within
firms in response to the shocks. We estimate the following statistical model of hourly wages;
wi,t = φj(i) + γyj(i),t +X ′i,tδ + εi,t, (2)
where yj(i),t is the (log) value added in year t of firm j, and φj(i) is a fixed effect for worker i if
she works in firm j, capturing time-invariant observed and unobserved characteristics of the firm
and worker. The vector X consists of time-varying controls and includes a cubic polynomial in
worker age and a full set of (two-digit) industry-by-year indicators, absorbing aggregate economic
or industry time shocks which could affect both firm value added and wages. We estimate equation
(2) separately for firms with and without worker representation, treating worker representation as
a time-invariant characteristic of the worker-firm match. To make sure it is pre-determined relative
to the value added shock, we measure the worker representation status of each worker in the first
year the worker is employed by the firm.
Our parameter of interest γ measures the pass-through rate of an idiosyncratic value added
shock to the wages of incumbent workers. This pass-through rate could be informative about the
degree of wage insurance offered by employers, as studied by the literature on insurance within the
firm (see e.g. Guiso et al., 2005; Juhn et al., 2018; Balke and Lamadon, 2020).
4.2.1 Difference-in-Differences illustration
Our baseline specification (2) includes fixed effects for both agents and time, essentially comparing
wages and value added within workers and firms while eliminating common changes over time. As in
the usual DiD design, identification of the pass-through rate requires a common trend assumption.
Figure 5 provides a visual inspection of the common trend assumption. To construct this figure,
we proceed as follows: In any given calendar year (denoted period t = 0), we (i) order the firms
according to the growth in value added net of industry specific shocks and spell fixed effects; (ii)
separate the firms at the median in the distribution of (residualized) value added growth, letting
the upper half be the treatment group and the lower half the control group; and (iii) plot the
differences in residualized log value added between these two groups in period t = 0 as well as in
the years before (periods t < 0) and after (periods t > 0). We perform these three steps separately
for each calendar year, always weighting each firm by the number of workers.
By construction, the treatment and control groups differ in the growth of residualized value
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added from t = −1 to t = 0, as shown in Panel (a). On average, firms in the treatment group
experience almost 30 percent larger growth in value added compared with firms in the control
group. Reassuringly, firms that experience larger growth in value added in period 0 are no more or
less likely to experience large growth in value added in periods -5 to -2, supporting the assumption
that the control group firms provide a valid counterfactual for the value added growth of treatment
group firms. In Panel (b), we plot the differences in residualized log value added between the
treatment and control group for each calendar year, and find that the firm shocks are similar in
magnitude across years.
In Panel (c), we perform the same steps as in Panels (a) and (b), but now separately for firms
with and without worker representation. For both groups of firms, the treatment group experiences
almost 30 percent larger growth in value added than the control group, and the differences between
the treatment and control group firms are stable between periods -5 and -2.
Panel (d) performs the same exercise, but this time for residualized log hourly wages of in-
cumbent workers who stay in the firm for at least six years. On average, incumbent workers in
firms with worker representation experience a 1% increase in hourly wages from t = −1 to t = 0.
By comparison, incumbent workers in firms without worker representation experience about a 3%
increase. Taken together with Panel (c), these figures imply a pass-through rate of value added
shocks to wages of around 0.02-0.03 for workers in firms with worker representation, and about
0.09-0.1 for workers in firms without representation.
4.2.2 Pass-through estimates
We now present point estimates of the pass-through rates and test whether there is a significant
difference in the pass-through rates of firms with worker representation and those without. Table
3 reports the results from estimating equation (2) using OLS, separately by whether the firm has
worker representation or not. The estimates are consistent with the conclusions from the DiD
analysis: In response to a 10 percent decrease in firm value added, wages of incumbent workers
in firms with representation decrease by 0.2 percent, while wages of workers in firms without
representation decrease by almost 0.9 percent. In the second row of Table 3, we estimate the
pass-through rates using log value added per worker. With both measures of firm performance, we
find large and significant differences in the pass-through of value added shocks to wages between
firms with and without worker representation: 0.066 and 0.051 percentage points, respectively, in
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Figure 5: Difference-in-differences representation of the pass-through estimation.
Notes: This figure illustrates the identification strategy using a difference-in-differences framework. Panel (a) plots
the differences in residualized value added between the treatment and control groups, as defined in the text. Panel (b)
plots the same differences separately for each calendar year, where the data is centered such that each dotted line at
period t = 0 corresponds to a separate calendar year. Panels (c) and (d) perform the steps in (a) and (b) separately
for stayers in firms with and without worker representation, for residualized value added and wages, respectively. The
sample used is the stayers sample as defined in Section 2.
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Table 3: Estimated pass-through rates by firms’ worker representation status.
Estimated pass-through rate γ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worker representation No worker representation Difference in
pass-through rates
(1) - (2)
p-value (1) = (2)
Measure of firm performance:
(log) Value Added 0.022 0.088 -0.066 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
(log) Value added pr. worker 0.013 0.063 -0.051 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Nr. of firms 1,520 44,877 46,397
Nr. of worker-year observations 828,688 1,579,477 2,408,165
Notes: This table shows estimated pass-through rates from equation (2), for two different measures of firm perfor-
mance; log value added and log value added per worker. Column 1 restricts to job spells where the worker is employed
by a firm with at least one worker representative in the first year of the spell. Similarly, Column 2 restricts to workers
employed by firms without worker representation in the first year of the spell. Column 3 reports the difference in
pass-through estimates between Columns 1 and 2. Column 4 reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the pass-
through rates in Columns 1 and 2 are equal. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. The standard errors
and p-values for the difference in point estimates are obtained by fully interacting equation (2) with an indicator for
worker representation. The sample used is the stayers sample as defined in Section 2.
22
5 Effects of adopting worker representation
In this section, we apply two research designs to estimate the impact of a firm exogenously adopting
worker representation. Using an RD design, we first show that the regulation governing the rights
to worker representation significantly increases the incidence of worker representation on corporate
boards, without affecting wages. We next turn to an event study design exploiting differences across
firms in the timing of adoption of worker representation, and find no evidence of any significant
change in incumbent workers’ compensation in the years following adoption, relative to the control
group comprised of workers in firms adopting worker representation later in the sample period.
5.1 Regression discontinuity design
To estimate the causal effects of adopting worker representation on worker compensation, the ideal
experiment would randomize worker representation on corporate boards across firms. In practice,
this experiment is infeasible because we cannot force some firms to change the composition of
their corporate board, while preventing others from doing so. Our RD design approximates this
ideal experiment by exploiting the discontinuity in workers’ rights to worker representation at the
30 employees cut-off. Workers in firms at or above the cut-off have the right to demand worker
representation on the corporate board, while workers right below the cut-off have no such rights.
5.1.1 RD setup and estimation
We implement our RD design using the following regression model;
wi = π + λTj(i) + h(Rj(i)) +X ′j(i)δ + νi, (3)
where wi denotes the log hourly wage of worker i in a given year, j(i) denotes the employer of
worker i in the same year, Rj(i) is the number of employees in the firm measured in January of the
year before, and Tj(i) ≡ 1[Rj(i) ≥ 30] is an indicator denoting whether the firm was above the firm
size cut-off. The vector Xj(i) consists of pre-determined characteristics including a full set of year,
industry, and region fixed effects, whether the firm is publicly listed, whether the firm is part of a
corporate group, and whether the board represents the entire corporate group. As long as firms do
not perfectly manipulate the running variable (the number of employees) and there are no other
changes happening discontinuously at the 30 employees cut-off, we can consistently estimate λ, the
causal effect of the regulation on wages for workers in firms at the cut-off.
To implement the RD design, we specify h(· ) as local linear regressions on each side of the cut-
off, using a triangular kernel density and a window of 10 employees around the cut-off. Appendix
Figure B.2 shows that the reduced form RD estimate is not sensitive to changing the bandwidth
on both sides of the cut-off. We follow Calonico et al. (2014) to obtain standard errors based on
bias-corrected local polynomials, and cluster the standard errors at the firm-level.
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5.1.2 Graphical evidence
A virtue of the RD design is that it provides a transparent way of showing how the causal effects
of the regulation are identified. To this end, we begin with a graphical illustration of the firm size
distribution and the distributions of pre-determined worker characteristics, before examining how
the share of firms with worker representation and the hourly wages of workers vary around the firm
size cut-off.
Firm size cut-off and sorting
One potential threat to the validity of our RD design is manipulation of the assignment variable, re-
sulting in sorting of firms around the cut-off. For instance, high-wage workers might sort into firms
above the cut-off in order to demand representation. Alternatively, firms might avoid hiring addi-
tional workers to stay below the cut-off and thus evade demands for worker representation. In these
cases, we would expect to see discontinuities around the cut-off – in pre-determined characteristics
or in the firm size distribution.
Panel (a) of Figure 6 shows the estimated density of firms around the cut-off in each firm size
bin of width two. While the unrestricted means show the underlying variation in the data, we
also plot estimated local linear regression lines on each side of the firm size cut-off, to illustrate the
trends in the data and the sizes of the discontinuities at the cut-off. There is no visible discontinuity
in the share of observations at the 30 employees cut-off, as manipulation of the assignment variable
would imply: The test proposed by McCrary (2008) is insignificant and we cannot reject the null of
no sorting around the threshold. Panels (b) - (f) of Figure 6 present estimates of discontinuities in
the sample means of pre-determined worker characteristics around the cut-off. Reassuringly, these
RD estimates are all close to zero and insignificant.
5.1.3 Causal effects of the regulation on worker representation and wages
In a sample covering all workers in firms with between 10 and 50 employees, there is only a small
change around the cut-off in the share of workers in firms with worker representation. There are
several potential reasons for this. First of all, the regulation does not prevent smaller firms from
choosing to elect a worker representative. Hence, even with perfect compliance with the regulation,
there would likely be some firms with worker representation below the cut-off. Moreover, some
of the firms below the cut-off in year t − 1 might have been larger in the past and decided to
continue the institution even though the number of employees dropped below 30 and the rights to
representation were no longer binding by law. Furthermore, some persistence in firm size above
the cut-off could be needed for firms to comply with the regulation, which states that a majority
of the workers can demand representation on the corporate board if the firm has more than 30
employees. Unless the firm chooses to adopt representation voluntarily, workers would need to
know that the firm employs more than 30 workers and petition for representation before they can
elect a representative. If the firm is only temporarily above the cut-off, workers may not notice, or
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(a) Firm size distribution (b) Male
(c) Unionized (d) Years of education
(e) Age (years) (f) Immigrant
Figure 6: Density of the assignment variable and pre-determined worker characteristics around the
firm size cut-off.
Notes: Panel (a) shows the share of worker-year observations in each firm size bin. Panels (b) - (f) plot the means
of pre-determined worker characteristics, where the scale of the y-axis is set equal to ±0.5 standard deviation of the
respective variable. The worker characteristics are defined in Appendix Table A.1. The dashed vertical lines denote
the regulation’s firm size cut-off of 30 employees, and the sample used is the RD sample as defined in Section 2.
Standard errors are based on bias-corrected local polynomials, and clustered at the firm-level.
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(a) Worker representation (b) (log) Hourly wages
Figure 7: Effects of the regulation on worker representation and hourly wages.
Notes: Panel (a) plots the mean residualized rates of worker representation, and Panel (b) plots the mean residualized
log hourly wages for workers in each firm size bin. The dependent variables are residualized with respect to a full set
of year, region, and industry fixed effects, and indicators for whether the firm is part of a corporate group and for
whether the board represents the entire corporate group. The dashed vertical lines denote the regulation’s firm size
cut-off of 30 employees. Each graph sets the scale of the y-axis equal to ±0.5 standard deviation of the respective
variable. The sample used is the RD sample as defined in Section 2, restricted to workers in firms with between 10
and 50 employees in year t− 1 which remained above or below the cut-off in years t− 1 and t− 2. Standard errors
are based on bias-corrected local polynomials, and clustered at the firm-level.
by the time they have noticed the firms can argue that they are only temporarily above the cut-off
and apply for an exemption from the regulation.
In Figure 7 (a), we therefore plot the fraction of workers in firms with at least one worker
representative on the board in January of year t for firms that remained on either side of the cut-off
for two consecutive years, t−2 and t−1. The figure shows a significant discontinuity at the cut-off,
with the share of workers in firms with worker representation approximately doubling, from about 8
to 16 percent. Consistent with the visual evidence, the RD estimate shows a statistically significant
8.9 percentage points jump at the cut-off.
Using the regulation to draw conclusions about the effects of worker representation on wages
requires an exclusion restriction, i.e. that the eligibility to demand worker representation in year
t−1 only affects wages in year t through the worker representation status of the firm in year t. Our
finding that some persistence in firm size is required before the regulation affects the incidence of
worker representation on corporate boards implies that this exclusion restriction is unlikely to hold:
Conditional on current firm size, past firm size is likely to affect contemporaneous wages through
other factors than just the right to worker representation. Nevertheless, we can still consistently
estimate the causal effect of the regulation on wages for workers in firms at the cut-off.
Figure 7 (b) illustrates the effect of the regulation on log hourly wages of workers. We plot
the mean of residualized (log) hourly wages in each firm-size bin and the estimated means using
local linear regressions on each side of the cut-off, and standardize the scale of the y-axis to ±0.5
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standard deviation of residualized log hourly wages. There is no visible discontinuous change in
hourly wages around the cut-off. Consistent with the graphical evidence, the estimated size of the
jump in hourly wages using equation (3) is only -0.9 percent, and not significantly different from
zero at conventional levels.
Panel A of Table 4 presents OLS and reduced form RD estimates, for all workers and separately
for different groups of workers. In the OLS specification, we regress log hourly wages on an indicator
for whether the worker is employed by a firm with worker representation, controlling for pre-
determined firm characteristics. For all subgroups, workers in firms with worker representation
earn significantly higher hourly wages than workers in firms without representation. In contrast to
the positive OLS estimates, the effects on hourly wages are all close to zero or negative. Only 1 out of
8 estimated reduced form effects are significantly different from zero. The one significant effect (for
unionized workers) is negative, suggesting that, if anything, adopting worker representation may
reduce wages. However, given the large number of worker subgroups, the probability of observing
significant changes around the cut-off by chance alone is quite large. And for all groups of workers,
we can reject the null hypothesis that the OLS and RD estimates are equal, which highlights that
selection on unobservables is a key concern when examining the effects of worker representation on
corporate boards.
5.2 Adoption of worker representation
Taken together, the RD results suggest that there are no significant positive effects of the regulation
on the hourly wages of workers. We now complement this reduced form evidence with an event
study analysis of workers’ compensation in the years around the adoption of worker representation.
5.2.1 Event study setup and estimation
Our event study design exploits differences in the timing of adoption of worker representation across
firms. This design can be expressed as an event study estimator that compares changes in wages
for workers employed in firms adopting worker representation in a given year to changes in wages
for workers employed in firms adopting worker representation in later years.
More concretely, for any year c ∈ {2006, 2012}, let the treatment group consist of all workers
employed in firms adopting worker representation in that year. The average change in wages
between time c + s and the baseline year c − s′ in the treatment group is denoted by E[wi,c+s −
wi,c−s′ |Cj(i) = c], where Cj(i) denotes the year in which the employer j of worker i adopted worker
representation. The control group is defined for each cohort c and event time s and consists of all
workers in the adoption subsample (as defined in Section 2) who are employed in firms that have
not adopted worker representation by year c+ s or c (whichever is greater), but that adopt worker
representation in a later year within our sample period. The event study estimator between the
treatment and control groups is defined as follows (for s ≥ 0);
E[wi,c+s − wi,c−s′ |Cj(i) = c]− E[wi,c+s − wi,c−s′ |Cj(i) < c+ s]. (4)
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The event study estimator eliminates unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity by com-
paring workers in firms adopting worker representation before and after the year of adoption, while
accounting for year and event-time effects by using workers in firms adopting worker representation
in a later year as a control group before worker representation is adopted in their firms. As long as
the workers in the treatment and control groups would have had a common trend in wages between
years c−s′ and c+s in the absence of adoption of worker representation, the event study estimator
in (4) recovers the average impact of adopting worker representation for cohort c in year c+ s for
s ≥ 0.
To implement the event study design, we use the following regression model. For each cohort
c and each event time s we create a subsample consisting of workers in firms adopting worker
representation in year c (the treatment group) and a control group of workers in firms that have
not adopted worker representation by period c or c+s, whichever is greater. Using this subsample,
we run the regression
wi,t = αc,s1 + α
c,s
2 1[Cj(i) = c] + πc,s1[t = c+ s] + ρc,s1[Cj(i) = c, t = c+ s] + εi,t, (5)
where αc,s1 is the control group mean in the baseline year (i.e., c− s′), α
c,s
2 is a fixed effect for the
treated workers (cohort c), πc,s is a time effect for event time s, and ρc,s is an interaction effect.
Our parameter of interest ρc,s measures differences in trends in wages between years c+s and c−s′
between the treatment and control groups. For s ≥ 0, this parameter captures the average impact
of adopting worker representation for cohort c under the common trends assumption.
5.2.2 Results
In Figure 8 we plot the estimated coefficients from equation (5). For each event time s ∈ {c −
3, . . . , c+ 3}, we report an equally weighted average of the cohort-specific coefficients ρc,s, with the
baseline event time c−2 normalized to zero.10 Reassuringly, we find no evidence of differential trends
in wages between current and later adopters in the pre-treatment event times. This is consistent
with the wages of workers in the treatment and control groups evolving in the same way across
years in the pre-treatment period, providing support for the common trends assumption. There is
also no evidence of significant effects of worker representation on wages in the post-treatment event
times. These results suggest that incumbent workers in firms adopting worker representation do
not experience significant wage gains, relative to their comparison groups, in the years following
adoption.
Table 4 reports the average treatment effects in the pre- and post-treatment periods, weighting
all cohorts and time periods equally, for the full adoption sample and separately for different
groups of workers. There are no significant effects of adoption on hourly wages in the years prior
10By first estimating the parameter ρc,s separately for each cohort c and then averaging these parameters across
cohorts, we avoid the problems pointed out by Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020) and Sun and Abraham (2020), and
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Figure 8: Effects of adoption of worker representation on (log) hourly wages.
Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients from equation (5). For each event time s ∈ {c− 3, . . . , c+ 3}, we
report an equally weighted average of the cohort-specific coefficients ρc,s, with the baseline event time c−2 normalized
to zero. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals constructed using standard errors clustered at the firm-level.
The dashed horizontal lines indicate the average treatment effects in the pre- and post-treatment periods, where all
time-periods and cohorts are weighted equally. The sample used is the adoption sample as defined in Section 2.
to adoption for any of the subsamples. Moreover, only 1 out of 8 estimated post-treatment effects
is significantly different from zero. For most groups, we can reject the null hypothesis that the
OLS estimates and the post-treatment event study estimates are equal, suggesting that the OLS
estimates of the effects of worker representation on wages are biased.
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Table 4: OLS, reduced form RD, and event study estimates.
Dependent variable: (log) Hourly wage
RD Adoption event study
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Worker subsample OLS Reduced form Difference (1) - (2) OLS Avg. pre Avg. post Difference (4) - (6)
All 0.038 -0.009 0.047 0.047 0.001 -0.003 0.049
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.018)
Demographics
Male 0.038 -0.013 0.051 0.043 -0.000 0.003 0.039
(0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.019)
Female 0.048 0.009 0.039 0.055 0.001 -0.007 0.062
(0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019)
Unionized 0.034 -0.024 0.057 0.032 -0.008 -0.018 0.050
(0.006) (0.009) (0.000) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.020)
Non-unionized 0.053 0.004 0.049 0.101 0.005 0.003 0.098
(0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015)
Education
Low-skilled 0.025 -0.010 0.034 0.031 0.007 -0.002 0.033
(0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.016)
High-skilled 0.058 -0.007 0.065 0.074 0.008 0.042 0.032
(0.007) (0.012) (0.000) (0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.021)
Occupation
Blue collar 0.034 -0.013 0.047 0.038 0.004 -0.021 0.059
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.018)
Manager 0.069 0.014 0.056 0.135 0.005 -0.011 0.146
(0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.021) (0.022)
Notes: OLS regressions control for a full set of year, region, and industry indicators, whether the firm is publicly
listed, whether the firm is part of a corporate group, and whether the board represents the entire corporate group.
The worker characteristics are defined in Appendix Table A.1. In the RD panel, the sample used is the RD sample
as defined in Section 2, restricted to workers in firms with between 10 and 50 employees in year t− 1 which remained
above or below the cut-off in years t− 1 and t− 2. Column (2) reports estimates of the coefficient λ from equation
(3). In the adoption panel, the OLS estimate is estimated using the stayers subsample and the adoption event study
estimates are estimated using the adoption subsample, as defined in Section 2, and the comparison groups are as
defined in the text. Columns (5) and (6) report averages of the cohort-specific coefficients ρc,s from equation (5) for
the pre- and post-treatment periods, respectively, where all time-periods and cohorts are weighted equally. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm-level in all columns. Standard errors of the differences in Columns 3 and 7 are
estimated using 50 block bootstrap draws in which the block is taken to be the firm.
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6 Interpreting the results
In Section 4, we reported results showing significant but modest causal impacts on wages of working
in a firm with worker representation. The results reported in Section 5, however, suggest that the
wage impacts of working in a firm with worker representation are not driven by worker represen-
tation per se, but rather by other factors that are correlated both with worker representation and
with worker compensation. In this section, we focus on two observable factors that are strongly cor-
related with worker representation – firm size and the share of unionized workers – and investigate
whether these two factors can help reconcile the results in Sections 4 and 5.
To this end, we first return to our analysis of job switchers from Section 4.1, and estimate
wage premia associated with working in larger or more unionized firms. Similarly, we revisit the
pass-through analysis from Section 4.2, and investigate the extent to which the pass-through of
value added shocks to wages depends on firm size or on the share of unionized workers. As a last
step, we control for these characteristics in both the job switchers and the pass-through analyses
to examine whether the difference in worker compensation between firms with and without worker
representation can be explained by these two characteristics.
6.1 Worker representation wage premium revisited
We begin by estimating the causal impact of working in a large or unionized firm on hourly wages.
To this end, we return to our analysis of job movers and use a similar differences-in-differences
setup, which we implement using the following regression model:
wi,s = αi + πs +
3∑
k=−3
τk1[s = k,G(i) = 1] + εi,s, (6)
where s denotes year relative to when the worker switched jobs, αi is a worker fixed effect, πs
denotes time effects, and G(i) is an indicator for whether worker i switched to a larger (or unionized)
firm. The treatment and comparison groups are constructed in the same way as in Section 4.1:
The treatment group includes workers switching from a smaller (non-unionized) firm to a larger
(unionized) firm, while the comparison group includes workers switching between two smaller (non-
unionized) firms. Including a comparison group allows us to look within workers over time while
eliminating changes in wages common to all workers moving from the same firm in the same year.
To make sure the firm characteristics are predetermined relative to the year of the move, we measure
the firm size and unionization rate of the origin and destination firms in year s = −2 . We define a
large firm as a firm with more than 50 employees, and a unionized firm as a firm in which more than
25% of workers are unionized. The coefficients of interest τk capture the wage impact of moving to
a larger (or unionized) firm, measured k years before or after the move.
Panel (a) of Figure 9 plots the DiD estimates from the specification in equation (6) of the wage
impacts of moving from a smaller to a larger firm. The dotted line plots the average wage impact in
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the post-treatment period (k > 0). Moving to a larger firm increases hourly wages by about 5%.11
Similarly, Panel (b) shows that moving to a unionized firm increases hourly wages by about 3%. In
both panels, we find no differences in wage growth between the treatment and comparison groups
in the years before switching jobs, lending credibility to our identifying assumption of parallel
trends between the two groups of workers. We therefore conclude that working in a larger or more
unionized firm has a positive and significant causal impact on wages.
Figure 9: Wage premia of observed firm characteristics correlated with worker representation.
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Notes: These figures plot the estimated τk coefficients (along with 95% confidence intervals) from the specification
in equation (6), for k ∈ {−3, . . . , 3}. The parameter τpost indicates the impact in the post-treatment period (k > 0).
In Panel (a), the treatment group includes workers switching from a firm with fewer than 50 employees to a firm
with more than 50 employees, while the comparison group includes workers switching between two firms with fewer
than 50 employees. In Panel (b), the treatment group includes workers switching from a firm in which less than 25%
of workers are unionized to a firm in which more than 25% of workers are unionized, while the comparison group
includes workers switching between two firms in which less than 25% of workers are unionized. In both figures, we
restrict to firms with at least one worker in both the treatment and comparison groups. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm-level.
Having documented causal impacts on wages of working in larger or more unionized firms, a
natural next question is whether these two characteristics can help explain the wage impact of
working in a firm with worker representation. In the first panel of Table 5, we therefore investigate
the sensitivity of the estimated worker representation wage premium to fixing firm size and the
share of unionized workers. Column 1 reports the 4% wage impact of moving to a firm with worker
representation (as reported in Column 1 of Table 2 in Section 4.1). In Column 2, we control for
the size of the destination firm (in bins) interacted with an indicator for the post-treatment period,
while the specification in Column 3 also controls for unionization rate interacted with an indicator
for the post-treatment period.12 Adding these controls reduces the coefficient of interest from 4.3
11Differences in wages across firms of different sizes, controlling for differences in worker quality, have been docu-
mented before; see e.g. Abowd et al. (1999).
12Controls for firm size and unionization rate in levels are subsumed by the worker fixed effects, since both variables
are measured in year s = −2.
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to 1.6%, suggesting that firm size and the share of unionized workers can account for more than
60% of the estimated worker representation wage premium. In Column 4, we also add controls
for a range of other observable firm and worker characteristics, such as industry and the share of
workers with a college degree, all interacted with an indicator for the post-treatment period. With
the full set of controls, the estimated worker representation wage premium is further reduced to a
non-significant 0.8%.
6.2 Pass-through analysis revisited
Next, we return to our analysis of the pass-through of firm shocks to the wages of incumbent
workers. As before, we focus on the stayers subsample and estimate the following specification
separately for workers in firms with different observed firm characteristics:
wi,t = φj(i) + γyj(i),t +X ′i,tδ + εi,t, (7)
where yj(i),t is the (log) value added of firm j in year t, φj(i) is a fixed effect for worker i if she
works in firm j, and Xi,t includes a full set of (two-digit) industry-by-year indicators and a cubic
polynomial in age. When equation (7) is estimated separately for workers in firms with different
observed firm characteristics, the parameter of interest γ measures the pass-through rate of an
idiosyncratic value added shock to the wages of incumbent workers in firms with different observed
characteristics, i.e. large vs small and unionized vs non-unionized.
Figure 10 plots the estimated pass-through rates by firm size (Panel (a)) and by the share
of unionized workers (Panel (b)). The estimates reported in Panel (a) show stark differences in
the sensitivity of wages to fluctuations in firm performance between smaller and larger firms: In
firms with fewer than 30 employees, a 10% decrease in firm value added is associated with a 1%
decrease in wages. By contrast, workers in firms with more than 200 employees only experience a
0.2% decrease in wages in response to a 10% decrease in firm value added. Similarly, the estimates
reported in Panel (b) show that the pass-through rates are also declining in the firm unionization
rate. We therefore conclude that the degree of wage insurance differs systematically across firms
according to both firm size and unionization.
In Panel B of Table 5, we investigate the sensitivity of the estimated difference in pass-through
rates between workers in firms with and without representation to controlling for firm size and the
share of unionized workers. Column 1 presents the estimate from Section 4.2, showing that the
decrease in wages in response to a 10% decrease in value added is 0.6 percentage points lower for
workers in firms with worker representation than for workers in firms without representation. In
Column 2, we control for the differential pass-through in larger versus smaller firms by interacting
(log) value added with firm size (binned), while the specification in Column 3 also controls for
the differential pass-through in unionized versus non-unionized firms by interacting (log) value
added with firm size (binned).13 Adding these controls reduces the difference in pass-through rates
13Controls for firm size and unionization rate in levels are subsumed by the worker-firm fixed effects φj(i), since
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Notes: This figure shows estimated pass-through rates (along with 95% confidence intervals) from equation
(7) estimated separately for workers in firms of different sizes (Panel (a)) and for workers in firms with
different unionization rates (Panel (b)). The sample is restricted to the stayers subsample as defined in
Section 2. The number of employees and the unionization rate of each firm are measured in the first year
the worker is employed by the firm. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.
between workers in firms with and without representation from 0.64 to 0.15 percentage points.14
This suggests that firm size and the share of unionized workers can account for almost 80% of the
estimated difference in pass-through rates between workers in firms with and without representation.
In Column 4, we also add controls for a range of other observable firm and worker characteristics.
With the full set of controls, the estimated difference in pass-through rates between workers in
firms with and without representation is further reduced to 0.07 percentage points.
both variables are measured in the first year the worker is employed by the firm.
14The reason why the point estimate in Column 1 of Panel B (-0.064) does not exactly match the point estimate
reported in Column 3 of Table 3 in Section 4.2 (-0.066) is that the sample used for Panel B of Table 5 is restricted
to observations for which we observe the full set of controls, to ensure that the sample remains unchanged across
columns.
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Table 5: Controlling for firm characteristics correlated with worker representation.
Dependent variable: (log) Hourly wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Worker representation wage premium
Post × Into-treatment 0.043 0.018 0.016 0.008
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Panel B. Pass-through rate
Worker representation × (log) Value added -0.064 -0.020 -0.015 -0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Controls
Baseline x x x x
Firm size x x x
Unionization rate x x
Other firm characteristics x
Notes: This table shows the wage impacts of worker representation after controlling for firm characteristics that are
correlated with worker representation. Panel A reports estimated worker representation wage premia from a version
of equation (1) where the period-specific indicators 1[s = k,G(i) = 1] and the corresponding coefficients τk are
replaced with a single post-treatment indicator 1[k > 0, G(i) = 1] and a single coefficient τpost. Column 1 controls
for worker fixed effects and an indicator for the post-treatment period. Column 2 adds an indicator for whether the
worker moved to a large firm interacted with the post-treatment indicator. Column 3 adds an indicator for whether
the worker moved to a unionized firm interacted with the post-treatment indicator. Column 4 controls for other
observed firm characteristics of the destination firm interacted with the post-treatment indicator. In all columns, the
sample is restricted to the observations in the movers subsample for which we observe all firm characteristics at both
the origin and destination firms. Panel B reports estimated differences in the pass-through of (log) value added to
wages between firms with and without worker representation, where the pass-through rates for each group of firms
are obtained from separate estimations of equation (2). Column 1 includes worker-firm and industry-by-year fixed
effects and a cubic polynomial in worker age. Column 2 controls for the differential pass-through in larger versus
smaller firms by interacting firm size (binned) with (log) value added. Column 3 additionally controls for the firm
unionization rate (binned) interacted with (log) value added. Column 4 controls for the differential pass-through
rate associated with other observed firm characteristics by interacting each characteristic with (log) value added. In
both panels, other observed firm characteristics include whether the firm is publicly listed, whether the firm is part
of a corporate group, and whether the board represents the entire corporate group, industry, firm age (bins), labor
share, capital to labor ratio, share of workers with a college degree, the average age of workers, share of workers who
are male, and the share of workers who are immigrants. We binarize all continuous controls at the median of the
distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level in both panels.
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7 Conclusion
Do employees benefit from worker representation on corporate boards? Economists and policy-
makers are keenly interested in this question – especially lately, as worker representation is widely
promoted as an important way to ensure the interests and views of the workers. The goal of our
paper was to empirically investigate this question, applying a variety of research designs to admin-
istrative data from Norway. We found that a worker is paid more and faces less earnings risk if
she gets a job in a firm with worker representation on the corporate board. However, these gains
in wages and declines in earnings risk are not caused by worker representation per se. Instead, the
wage premium and reduced earnings risk reflect that firms with worker representation are likely
to be larger and unionized, and that larger and unionized firms tend to both pay a premium and
provide better insurance to workers against fluctuations in firm performance. Conditional on the
firm’s size and unionization rate, worker representation has little if any effect. Taken together,
these findings suggest that while workers may indeed benefit from being employed in firms with
worker representation, they would not benefit from legislation mandating worker representation on
corporate boards.
A natural question is whether these findings are specific to the Norwegian setting or generalize
more broadly. To shed light of this difficult question, it is useful to compare our findings to those
reported in previous work from the German setting (see e.g. Gorton and Schmid, 2004; Jaeger,
Schoefer and Heining, 2019). Germany has a two-tiered board system, with both a supervisory
board and an executive board. Norway, on the other hand, has the same system as in the US,
the UK, and several other European countries, with a single-tiered board of directors. Worker
representatives on the executive boards of Norwegian corporations are likely to be more directly
involved in day-to-day operations than those on the supervisory boards of German corporations.
Despite the differences in institutions, however, our findings are broadly consistent with the results
from the German setting. This indicates that the conclusion about the absence of wage impacts of
worker representation may indeed generalize across shared governance systems that differ markedly
in the degree to which workers are given authority in the corporate decision-making.
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A Data
Table A.1: Variable definitions
Variable Description
Labor market outcomes Source: Tax Records and the Norwegian Labor and Welfare Administration
Earnings Annual pre-tax labor earnings measured at the worker-firm level. Earnings include fixed salary, bonus,
overtime, and vacation and severance pay, but exclude sickness benefits.
Hours worked Number of contracted hours worked each calendar year.
Hourly wage Annual earnings divided by hours worked. Outliers below the 5th percentile are winsorized.
Firm accounts Source: The Register of Company Accounts
Revenues Total annual sales by each firm in a given year.
Cost of inputs Cost of materials and intermediate inputs for each firm in a given year.
Value added Revenues minus cost of inputs.
Labor share Annual wage bill divided by value added.
Capital to labor ratio Total firm assets divided by annual wage bill.
Corporate boards Source: The Register of Legal Entities
Director’s role Indicates each director’s role on the board, e.g. chair vs regular directors.
Elected by Indicates whether each director is elected by and among the employees or by shareholders.
Level of representation Indicates whether the board governs a single firm or a corporate group with several firms.
Worker characteristics Source: National Education Database, Central Population Register, and Tax Returns
Age Age in years, measured at the beginning of each year.
Male Indicator variable for male workers.
Tenure Tenure with the current firm in years, measured at the beginning of each year.
Immigrant Indicator for individuals having a country of birth other than Norway.
Unionized Indicator for union membership based on union membership fee deductions in the tax returns.
Years of education Number of years corresponding to highest completed level of education.
Low-skilled Indicator for individuals without a college degree.
High-skilled Indicator for individuals with a college degree.
Blue collar Indicator for individuals having a blue collar occupation based on the first digit of the International
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) codes.
Manager Indicator for individual having a job with primarily managerial duties based on 3-digit ISCO-88 codes.
Firm characteristics Source: Central Register of Establishments and Enterprises and the Norwegian Labor and Welfare
Administration.
Firm size Number of employees measured as the number of registered workers at the beginning of each year,
part-time workers are counted as 0.5
Firm age Number of years since establishment.
Region Region indicators based on 4-digit code for the municipality in which a firm is located in a given year.
Industry 2-digit code classifying a firm’s main activity according to the Nomenclature of Economic Activities (first
two digits of NACE2007) system.
Corporate group Indicator for firms that are part of a corporate group.
Board of corporate group Indicator for firms that are the parent firm within a corporate group.
Publicly listed Indicator for publicly listed firms.
Average age The average age of employed workers measured at the beginning of each year.
Share of male workers Share of employed workers who are male.
Share of immigrant workers Share of employed workers having a country of birth other than Norway.
Share of skilled workers Share of employed workers with a college degree.
Unionization rate Share of employed workers deducting union membership fees in the tax returns.
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B Additional Figures and Tables
Figure B.1: Fraction of explained variability in worker representation attributable to each pre-
determined firm characteristic.
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Notes: This figure plots the partial R2s of each firm characteristic from a regression of an indicator for whether the
firm has at least one worker representative on the corporate board on the firm’s industry, age, unionization rate, size,
whether the firm is publicly listed, whether the firm is part of a corporate group, and whether the board represents
the entire corporate group. The label “Firm structure” refers to the three last mentioned characteristics. The partial
R2s are normalized to sum to one such that each of the reported values can be directly interpreted as the share of
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated reduced form effects of the regulation on hourly wages from equation (3) for
different choices of bandwidth. The dashed gray lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The sample used is the RD
sample as defined in Section 2, restricted to workers in firms with between 10 and 50 employees in year t− 1 which
remained above or below the cut-off in years t− 1 and t− 2.
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